STATE LEGISLATIVE RELIEF FOR THE MORTGAGE
DEBTOR DURING THE DEPRESSION
J. DOUGLASS

POTEAT*

If a man owe a debt and Adad [the storm god] inundate his field and
carry away the produce, or, through lack of water, grain have not grown
in the field, in that year he shall not make any return of grain to the
creditor, he shall alter his contract-tablet and he shall not pay the interest
for that year. THE CODE OF HAMMURAB, KING OF BABYLON, circa 2250
B.C. 1
The sensitiveness of state legislatures to pressure by debtor groups during hard
times is traditional. This tendency has been both noted and regretted by "the truly
wise as well as the virtuous"' of other generations. It was of such a time during the
days of the Articles of Confederation that Chief Justice Marshall said, "The power of
changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts
...had been used to such an excess by the state legislatures as to break in upon the
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man.
The mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people
''3
and destroy the sanctity of private faith.
But creditor interests have not been without their partisans in legislative halls.
Again we have the word of the great Chief Justice that it was "to guard against the
continuance of the evil"" of such state legislative immorality that "that additional
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights-the contracts clause of the
Constitution ' 4 found its place in the United States Constitution.
Indeed, it may be said that in broad outline, the history of debtor-creditor legislation in this country marks the turn of the economic cycle from periods of prosperity
to those of hard times. This becomes strikingly apparent so far as the national legislature is concerned when we recall the history of bankruptcy legislation. 5 For to
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I THE CODE or HAMMuRAEI (Harper's 2d ed. 1904) §48, p. 27.

'The phrase is that of Chief justice Marshall in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, r2 Wheat. 213, 355
(U. S. 1827).

3

ibid.
8ibid.
Tim FEDERuAisr (1788) No. 44; see also BEARD, AN AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITMON (zg3); Hamilton, In re The Smell Debtor (1933) 42 YALE L, J. 473.
5
See, generally, WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORy (1935).
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observe the dates of the various bankruptcy acts is to note the incidence of those
periods of hard times in our economic history which have distinguished themselves
by their breadth and depth of reach. The act of i8oo,8 it is true, though following a
period of economic collapse, was not designed primarily as a means of debtor relief.
Modelled on the English law of that time, discharge from the debtor's obligations
was an incident to be granted only in the rarest cases. But the next act 7 passed in
1841 in the midst of a severe economic crisis carries a definite accent on debtor relief
as a primary if novel function of bankruptcy.8 And although this law was on the
statute books for only eighteen months, yet in that brief period 28,000 debtors were
relieved of $445,000,000 in obligations by the surrender of property worth hardly
one-tenth that sum. 9
And so, although in the act of 186710 the "merchants and bankers in New York,
Philadelphia and Boston" to whom those "rebel" debtors of the south had owed
$3oo,ooo,ooo at the outbreak of the war gained temporary assistance in "collecting
something of the millions of indebtedness due them from the rebel regions of the
country""-the industrial crash of 1873, exceeding in extent and severity any the
country had experienced, precipitated a demand for liberalization of the act in favor
of the debtor and resulted in the amendment of 187412 by which a composition
device was added and discharge provisions were relaxed. Likewise, the perennial
attacks on the present act, itself passed in the aftermath of the depression of z893,
reflect the recurrence of normal "creditor times." They have been directed to
strengthening the criminal and discharge provisions to prevent the "fraud and reckless speculation" permitted by the act in the original form. The Donovan reports
of the early i93o's with their recommendations of reform pointed toward "creditor
relief";' 3 but with the persistence of the present depression with its focus again
to the act which in form and
turned on debtor troubles, we have 1933 amendments
' 4
tide at least are "for the Relief of Debtors.'
The same tendency may be. observed in the debtor-creditor legislation of the
states. Indeed, we may assume that, had the states been as free from constitutional
02 STAT. I9 (I800).

'5 STAT. 440 (x84x).
"Iam free to confess my leading object to be to relieve
'In debate on the bill
Daniel Webster said:
those who are at present bankrupt, and who cannot be discharged or set free but by a Bankruptcy Act
passed by Congress.. . . Between the want of power in the state and the want of will in Congress,
unfortunate. insolvents are left to hopeless bondage. . . . The cases of the hopeless debtor have been accumulating for a whole generation." 5 WEsaS, WoRKS (9th ed. 1856) x8.
'CoNG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3 d Sess. (842) 69.
" 15 STAr. 517 (1867). For the text of this law, see Co-;o. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong.,. 2d Sess. (1867) app.
228 etseq.
1
'CoNG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867) xx86-xx89.
= X8 STAT. 178 (1874).
"Donovan Report on Administration of Bankrupt Estates, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 71st Cong.,
3d Sess. (1931) passim.
" Act of March 3, 1933, C.204, 47 STAT. 1467, 1x U. S. C. c. 8. See especially §74 (individual compositions and extensions) and §75 (agricultural extensions and compositions, the Frazier-Lemke Act). As
revised by the Chandler Act, approved June 22, 1938, these amendments appear in the Bankruptcy Act as
follows: C. XI, Arrangements, §§300-400; C. XII, Real Property Arrangements by Persons Other Than
Corporations, §§400-600. A new chapter (C. XIII) is added on Wage Earner Plans, §§6o0-700.
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inhibition as Congress, more legislation in the debtor's interest would have resulted.
A few laws were passed in the panic of I837-I8A42.

5

A great many more were

enacted by the southern states during the reconstruction period to alleviate the desperate financial condition in which the southerners found themselves after the war. 16
With little exception, however, although such acts were phrased in the language of
remedial reform to avoid the hazard of constitutional negation, they were declared
7
by the courts invalid nonetheless.'
The response of the state legislatures to the demands for mortgage debtor relief is
therefore squarely in the national and state legislative tradition. By 1932 the hope of
a quick upsurge of general prosperity had vanished and the mounting number of
foreclosures with the expropriation of farmers and homeowners could not be longer
ignored by the legislators. And as the economic strain was more widespread, so the
legislative response of the states was more extensive than it had ever been before.
But it was not until the debtor's financial ills had reached pandemic proportions that
the legislatures of the states were induced to prescribe. By that time it was too late
for preventives. A thdrapeutic was indicated. And this in the legal idiom is simply
to say that a law to be effective had to be retrospective, not merely prospective. But
it is precisely at this point that the contracts clause of the Constitution obtrudes,
although by judicial interpretation it leaves a narrow field of competence untouched.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield'8 which came before
the Court in 1819, said "The distinction between the obligation of a contract and
the remedy give5 by the legislature to enforce that obligation has been taken at the
bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct."
And in an 1866 case'" this language was amplified by the statement that: "It is competent for the states to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as
they may see fit provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of
remedy, which are deemed legitimate, and those which, under the form of modifying the remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its
own circumstances. Whenever the result last mentioned is produced, the act is
within the prohibition of the Constitution, and to that extent void."
It is only against the background of this language that the miscellany of state
debtor relief legislation is intelligible. For the area of legitimate state action staked
"Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HAxv. L. Rav. io6r, app. I.

1"The following preamble of an act "for- the relief of the people of Georgia" passed by the Georgia
legislature, Laws i865-x866, no. 255, may be taken as an indication of the temper of the legislators of that

period. "Whereas, During the late war, the state of Georgia has been overrun by the opposing armies;
the accumulated crops and agricultural stock in great measure destroyed; the Confederate indebtedness
held by the people in exchange for their products has become valueless; and obligations of the State

eagerly sought after as a safe investment, have been repudiated; the accumulated capital of nearly a
century, represented by slave labor, amounting to nearly $3,ooo,ooo, has been destroyed and the prospect

of successful agriculture, the basis of all value, now dependent-upon the voluntary labor of freedmen, is a
question of doubt and experiment, Therefore," etc.
"Feller, supra note z5, app. I.

is4 Wheat. 122, 200 (1819).

"Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 553-554 (1866).
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out in the early decisions has undergone little variation since. As might be expected,
to avoid constitutional censorship the states have phrased their laws in terms of
remedial reform. But even so, as we shall observe, many of the laws so masked have
nevertheless been declared trespassers on a forbidden domain.
The many acts, their amendments and the decisions of the courts construing
them are too voluminous to press within the framework of a single article. The
appendix will give the detail of the enactments by states with some of the more noteworthy decisions on the laws. The text of the article will accordingly be devoted to
a more general treatment of the movement for mortgage-debtor relief as it is reflected
in the state statutes and decisions. These statutes fall into three general .groups:
(i) the moratorium by which the courts are authorized to delay foreclosure proceedings for a definite period of time expressed in the statute; (2) the extension of existing redemption periods; and (3) the prevention of abnormally large deficiency judgments following foreclosure sales, either by sanctioning the fixation of an upset price
below which the property may not be sold, or by requiring the determination of a
"fair market value" by the court, which figure rather than the sale price must be
credited on the judgment. Although these devices are dealt with separately, it should
be noted that some states utilize all and some combine two in their statutes.
THE MoRAToiuum

The device for relieving the mortgagor which has received the widest acceptation
during the present period of depression is the moratorium. In all, 28 states have
passed such laws. At first the legislatures seemed loath to deal drastically with existing mortgage foreclosure procedure. Coupled with this reluctance, it may be assumed, was the expectation that if foreclosures were enjoined for the period of the
dark days of early 1933 the inevitable return to normal times would set all things
right. At any rate, we find the first steps in the direction of mortgagor relief timid
indeed. The Arkansas act, approved in February of 1933, seems to reflect this
attitude in its provision for a postponement of the filing of answers in foreclosure
proceedings for a period of three months.20 And even this step finds its rationalization not in the necessity for relief to mortgagors but "in the relief of congested
dockets of the chancery courts." But with the continued downward spiral of
deflation the movement for moratory legislation quickly gained momentum and
stays of longer duration became the rule.
These laws with almost no exception are prefaced by a long preamble in which
the desperate financial ills of the country are cataloged. And the world-wide economic depression is taken as the broad base upon which the exercise of an enlarged
police power may find support. They are phrased in the language of remedial reform
'Ark. Laws 1933, no. 21; see also the Texas legislative sequence of that year. An act postponing sales
under execution f6r four weeks because of the banking holiday (Laws 1933, c. 17) was followed by
another before. its expiration granting a further extension of short duration-crowded dockets being
proffered in the statute as the explanation (Id. c. 59). Another (id. c. xo5) and then the Greathouse
Moratorium Law (id. c. 1o2) authorizing the continuance of actions for the recovery of real property or
foreclosure of liens for a period of i8o days stated as their justification the extraordinary financial
emergency and depression.
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to escape collision with the contracts clause. And largely under the liberalizing

influence of the United States Supreme Court's decision in the Blaisdell case 21 the
state courts have not withheld approval.
A notable exception, however, is found in Texas. In an earlier generation its
supreme court as a preface to a liberal interpretation of its debtor exemption law,
had boasted of the fact that "from the early -days of the Republic to the present
time [1878] Texas has been the refuge of the unfortunate of other countries.' 2' But
in 1934 when the legislature, declaring a state of emergency, undertook under its
police power to authorize judges of the district courts to grant continuances and stays
of execution in foreclosure suits, 23 it was told in an opinion by the state supreme court

that such action in the debtor's interest transcended the bounds of legitimate endeavor
under the Texas Constitution.2 4 And confronted by this judicial intransigence the
Texas legislature made no further efforts to devise mortgagor relief.
Most of those states in which the moratory statutes have been accepted without
constitutional objection or which have met and overcome such objection, have extended by subsequent enactment the force of the laws. Not a few, however, have
permitted them to lapse.25 The common practice has been to grant to the outstanding
act a lease of life sufficient to carry it into the next legislative term so that if conditions at that time warrant an extension it may be granted with no interruption of
the stay. Sixteen state legislatures have so acted, the present acts expiring by their
terms on various dates during 1938, 1939 and 1940.28 These extensions are premised
on the assumption that the emergency which called into being the exercise of this
extraordinary legislative authority still persists and economic conditions demand as
strongly as ever that their provisions be continued. The statutes are temporary by
their own terms. Indeed, it is precisely this feature on which their constitutionality
depends. The Supreme Court of the United States in the Blaisdell case, calling to its
support the language of an earlier precedent2 7 to the effect that a law "depending
upon the existence of an emergency or other certain states of facts to uphold it may
cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when
passed," has held that "it is always open to judicial inquiry whether the exigencies
still exist upon which the continued operation of the law depends" '28 And while "the
declaration by the Legislature as to the existence of the emergency is entitled to great
respect, it is not conclusive"; 29 and there have been skeptical voices raised in at least
two supreme courts of the states questioning the validity of emergency legislation in
a period no longer of that complexion.
"Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
'Texas Laws 1934, 2d Called Sess., c. 16.
'Black v. Rockmore, 50 Tex. 88, 96 (1878).
"Travelers' Inc. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S. W. (2d) 1oo7 (19A). See Comment (z934)
13 Tax. L. REV. 78.
"'Del., Idaho, Ill., Kan., Md., N. H., N. C. (various local laws), Okla., S. C., Tex., Vt.
'Ala., Ariz., Cal., Iowa, La., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mont., Neb. (unconst.), N. Y., N. D., Ohio,
Pa., S. D., Wis.
' Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924).
ibid.
'Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 290 U. S. 398, 442 (1934).
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In early 1933 the Nebraska legislature imposed a stay upon foreclosure decrees. °
This moratorium was to expire March i, 1935; but by subsequent enactments in 1935
and in 1937 it was extended to March i, 1939.31 The constitutional validity of the
1933 act and its 1935 amendment was not made the subject of inquiry by the
Nebraska Supreme Court though the statute was sanctioned by construction and
application.3 2 In 1938, however, the court emerged from its self-imposed judicial
moratorium to declare the 1937 act unconstitutional, grounding its decision on the
observation that the "temporary emergency . . . which had given vitality to the
earlier mortgage laws in 1937 has ceased to exist."33 Mr. Justice Eberly speaking for
the court said: "It appears that there is no crisis now prevailing which involves a
general paralysis of business and finance, and that the unfortunate condition now
confronting us is strictly a 'continued depression.' "3 4 Accordingly, the court denied
the law its blessing.
Likewise in Mississippi the court has become skeptical of the constitutional validity of its moratorium which, initiated in 1934,35 has been subsequently renewed. The
last renewal of this act,3 6 approved March i6, 1938, extended its operation until
May i, 194o. In May of this year the Mississippi Supreme Court in the case of
Atlantic Life*Insurance Company v. Klotz3 7 observed as follows: "We think it may

be now seriously questioned whether any such emergency continues to exist in this
state as will support the further operation of the re-enacted so-called moratorium law,
especially as to deeds of trust and mortgages given before the passage of these statutes.
.. . Courts take judicial knowledge of general conditions throughout their territorial
jurisdiction, and we must begin to have some comprehension, as everybody else who
is observant, that general business conditions have now returned to that which is as
nearly normal as will perhaps ever again exist upon the general average in this
section. It may, therefore, well be now inquired whether there is constitutional warrant for the further continuance of the enforcement of said moratorium laws." But
since appellant did not press the question in argument, the court was content to "go
no further in response to it than is said in the foregoing paragraph."
But the instances just noted are, after all, exceptional. Indeed, it is mainly in this
fact that their interest lies. The courts of most of the moratory states under the
pressure of the Blaisdell case have shown no disposition to deny either the severity
or the persistence of the depression on the assumption of which the laws have been
extended. This has forestalled constitutional demolition. It has also served to shift
the scene of action from the field of legislation to that of judicial construction and
application. Reference to the experiences of the states outlined in the appendix will
indicate in some detail the degree of interaction between court and legislature. The
situation has, moreover, brought out the residual power in the judiciary to narrow
Neb. Laws 1933, c. 65.
'Neb. Laws 1935, c. 41; id. 1937, C. 42.
=See, e.g., Howarth v. Becker, 128 Neb. 580, 259 N. W. 505 (x935).
'First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Smith, 277 N. W. 762 (Neb. 1938).

uIbid.
'Miss. Laws 193 8,H. B. No. 152.

'Miss. Laws 1934, C. 247; id. 1936, C. 287.
'7181 So. 519 (Miss. 1938).
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the reach of legislative action, the exercise of which is exemplified in the sketchy
picture which follows of the process in a single state, Iowa.
The moratory legislation in the debtor's interest undertaken by the Iowa legislature in 193338 consisted of two devices: (i) pending foreclosure suits were continued until March I, 1935, the mortgagor being required to pay an amount deter-

mined by the court as the reasonable price of possession during this period; and (z)
.unexpired redemption periods were likewise extended, the owner being entitled to
possession in the meantime, if he apply income from the property to the payment of
taxes, indebtedness, etc.

Before the expiration date of these acts, both were further extended to March i,
x937. 9 With this exception little material change was made in the amendments.
It is a judicial commonplace that in construing these acts, the mortgagor is given
the benefit of the doubt, and it was early said that "the granting of the continuance
is to be the rule under the statute" unless the mortgagee shall convince the court
of good cause to the contrary.4 0 But this did not mean "that the purposes and intent"
of the act was to give relief to property owners hopelessly insolvent for whom there
could be no possible rehabilitation. If a mortgagee could so define his debtor's condi41
tion "good cause" had been shown.
The Iowa statute contained no moral requirement comparable to that of New
Hampshire that the petition for relief contain "a brief statement of his (the debtor's)
past conduct in meeting his legal obligations and liabilities." 42 But at least the court
proposed that when he "prayed for relief," the debtor's hat be held in "clean
hands." 43 The court sympathetically observed that the "gift of prophetic vision . . .
was withheld from these lowly swains of the soil and the alluring mirage of perpetual prosperity led them deep into the uncharted desert of unprecedented depression.... ",44 But this was not to say that one who bought a farm within the
moratorium period for speculative purposes could thus recoup with the aid of a
prolonged legal stay. The moratorium was not for him.45
It was said in 1936 that to continue a mortgagor in possession whose payments
are not sifficient to carry the property and who has no prospect of redeeming, violates
the contracts clause. 40 But when the legislature in 1937 extended the moratorium to
'Iowa Laws 1933, c. 179.
'Id. 1935, cC. 115, 110.
'Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339, 252 N. W. 507 (1934).
"Reed v. Snow, ,18 Iowa 1165, 254 N. W. 8oo (934). It was also held in Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Laufersweiler, 221 Iowa ioo8, 267 N. W. 74 (1936), that a receiver of an insolvent bank is not
entitled to moratory relief. He is not an "owner" in the sense of the statute.
"N. H. Laws 1933, c. x61.
'Miller v. Ellison, 221 Iowa 1174, 265 N. W. 9o8 (1936). In Butenschoen v. Frye, 219 Iowa 570,
258 N. W. 769 (935) the court said of a motion for a continuance: "The motion is addressed to a court
of equity and good conscience for relief and succor for one who because of the emergency . . . is unable
to prevent the immediate sale and sacrifice of the security pledged for the debt." But. "He who seeks
equity must do equity." And the debtor "was neither in distress nor would he acknowledge any willingness to do equity . . . " and so was not entitled to relief.
"Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 221 Iowa 591, 266 N. W. 282 (1936).
'Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Kirby, 221 Iowa 115o, 266 N. NV. 520 (1936).
'"John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schlosser, 222 Iowa 447, 269 N. W. 435 (936).
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March x, x939, although "applications for relief had to be in 'good faith'" it was
stipulated that a showing of the mortgagor's present insolvency or of the inadequacy
of the security should not in itself constitute good cause for refusal to grant a continuance.47 And in the similar extension of the redemption statute the same language
48
was employed.
If the court has said that this new language adds "little if anything to [its own]
judicial pronouncements," at any rate there is some evidence of a disposition to take
the statute's language at face value.49 The case in which this was said presented a
debtor in bankruptcy whose real property was rejected by that court as burdensome.
His only other tangible assets were a tractor, also mortgaged, and a team of horses,
and his debts exceeded his assets by more than $6,ooo. But counsel had said that the
land involved was in the "garden spot of the world" and the debtor had "the aid
of the Good Samaritan neighbor" to help operate his farm, so the court was unable
to say that the prospect of redemption was so remote as to justify withholding a
continuance.5 °
Not all of the emergency laws have been confined in their operation to debts
secured by real property mortgages or deeds of trust, though by far the great majority
have been so limited. The most striking example of a general debt moratorium by
which all laws related to the enforcement of any debt, public or private, except those
due the United States, its agencies, or the state are suspended, is that of Louisihna.
This act originally passed in I93451 by the legislature (which under the Louisiana
Constitution is given the power to authorize the suspension of the laws of the
state), 52- has been subsequently renewed without interruption and unless repealed or
invalidated by the courts will continue in force until the twentieth day after the
53
adjournment of the 194o legislature.
By its terms the State Bank Commissioner is made Debt Moratorium Commissioner and is authorized to set up the necessary administrative machinery. Following
a hearing before him participated in by the debtor and his creditor, the Commissioner is authorized "to suspend all laws or parts of laws relative to the enforcement
of any debt [as herein defined] . . . and to suspend all laws or parts of laws

authorizing the reduction of such debt to judgment or the enforcement thereof, or
the enforcement of any lien, privilege of mortgage securing the same ...for such
period of time and under such terms and conditions as to the payment of any part
of such debt, in principal or ifiterest, by installment or otherwise ...

as may seem

just, reasonable, fit and proper in each particular case involved." Jurisdiction of the
Commissioner extends also to all pending judicial proceedings and upon the filing
of his order in the court involved its process is thereby suspended, though an appeal
from such order may be taken by any party interested to the district court which
'"Iowa Laws 1937, C. 8o.
'Id., c. 79.
'Id. at 39.

"Replogic v. Ebert, 274 N. W. 37 (Iowa 1937).
"La. Acts 1934, 2d Extr. Sess., act no. 2.

"Art. XIX, s. 5.

3La. Acts 1938, act no. 126.
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may not, however, enjoin any order of the Commissioner pending the rendition of
a definitive judgment by the appropriate court of appeal.5 4
EXTENSION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD

The plight of the hapless debtor under the early Common Law is well known.
Imprisonment was his lot if he failed to pay, and the*judges of that day seemed no
less apathetic toward his troubles than the Law which they professed to serve. 55 Nor
was the mortgagor-debtor who defaulted dealt with much less harshly. His mortgagee held title to his land and default in payment meant immediate forfeiture of
any chance to get it back. It is against this backdrop of ill fortune that the debtor's
role as underdog is dramatized. And this may have served in part at least, to point
up his demand that in the name of fair play restraint be imposed on his adversary
mortgagee. At any rate, the courts did intervene in his behalf. The Chancellor,
drawing his authority from Equity, tempered the shock of immediate expropriation
by inventing the "equity of redemption," a doctrine which permitted the mortgagor
to pay his debt within a specified period after default and thus regain the land which
had passed to his mortgagee. And this, said a Lord Chancellor in 1762, on the theory
supported by '"great reason and justice" that "necessitous men are not, truly speaking,
free men but, to answer a present exigency will submit to any terms that the crafty
5
may impose upon them. 6
The judicial sale, no part of this early procedure-which still exists today in a
few states as "strict foreclosure"--was a later development, coming by way of
statutory enactment. The period of redemption (somewhat similar to the equity of
redemption ordained by the English Chancellor) which found its way into some of
the foreclosure-by-judicial-sale statutes of the states comes into existence following
the sale and continues for a stated period thereafter.5 8 Apparently in all but four
5

The act applies only to debts contracted prior to jaly x,1936; but such debts thereafter renewed or
extended for the duration of the act are exempted from its operation. Mr. Sol Weiss, Jr., of the New
Orleans Bar, writing of this act under the tide "Radicalism or Reform" in the Commercial Law Journal,
May 1935, says that it is simple, informal, expeditious and free of costs. The procedure before the Commissioner as he describes it is not unlike that in bankruptcy, with the furnishing of schedules of debts
and assets, participation of the creditors in the examination of the debtor and his books, and participation
by all creditors under the order of the Commissioner in the assets and income of the petitioning debtor
under conditions scaling down debts and extending maturity dates during the duration of the act. The
writer declared that "In actual practice, when a conditional moratorium is granted subject to stipulated
payments, the Commissioner usually appoints one of the larger creditors as trustee to receive and distribute
the dividends." He also declares that "Except where the application is made by the distressed owner of
real estate where no early appreciation in value or income can reasonably be expected, the moratoria thus
far granted have not exceeded a period of three or four months."
See also provision for local mediation board in the Wis. Laws 1933, c. 15, id. 1935, c. 319.
'In 1551 Chief Justice Mountague in the case of Dive v. Maningham, i Plowden 6o, said of one
committed to prison for debt "neither the plaintiff nor the sheriff is bound to give him meat or drink
if he has no goods, he shall live on the charity of others, and if others will give him nothing, let
him die in the name of God, if he will, and impute the cause of it to his ow fault, for his presumption
and ill behavior brought him to that.imprisonment."
'Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden iso (1762). See Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure
Sale-The Uniform Mortgage Act (1925) 23 Mtcm. L. Rev. 825.
-Conn., Ill., Maine, Vt.
'An exposition of the statutory provisions of the several states relating to foreclosure and redemption
may be found in 3 JoNES, MOROAEs (8th ed. 1928) ss.
x695-x746. In four states the period precedes the
sale.
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states"9 the mortgagor enjoys possession during this period and in most states rentfree. 60 The ostensible purpose of this mortgagor privilege is to afford a breathing
spell during which the debtor may refinance his indebtedness or gather his growing
crops. A less obvious but certainly important practical benefit, however, is the same
as that sought to be accomplished by the acts discussed in the next section: the
diminution of deficiency judgments. But here it is the mortgagee himself who
diminishes the potential judgment, not the court. For generally the price of redemption is not the mortgage debt but the bid price at which the property was knocked
down plus interest and costs. Accordingly for the mortgagee to protect himself
against a loss of his security at less than its value, he must bid at least what he judges
that value to be. And, of course, the higher bid thus induced lessens the amount of
the deficiency which the mortgagor must make up. 1
As these statutory provisions for redemption antedate the mortgages with which
the courts have been concerned in this current depression period, constitutional
objection does not intrude.6 2 But quite generally the existing redemption periods
have been lengthened by the various states so as to fit into the moratory schemes
adopted. And as the moratorium, acting retrospectively, must undergo the censorship of the contracts clause, so these amendments must do likewise." The result is
that while quite a few statutes in their original form make no requirement that
"rental value or income from the property" accruing during this statutory respite be
applied on the debt, the recent statutory extensions do require this appropriation.
The statute of Minnesota 64 may be cited as typical. For, having received the constitutional sanction of the United States Supreme Court at an early date in the
Blaisdell case, it has furnished the pattern which most of the statutes have followed.
By the law of Minnesota, passed long before the depression struck, a mortgagor
might redeem his foreclosed property within a year after sale if foreclosure was by
advertisement, or within a year after confirmation of sale, if by action. And the
Minnesota Supreme Court had held that during such period the mortgagor's right
to possession also included the rents and profits from the property." When, however, in 1933 because of the "public economic emergency" existing in the state, the
legislature moved to extend unexpired redemption periods, the act which it passed
required the mortgagor "to pay all or a reasonable part of such income or rental
value, . . . toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage or judgment
'Ala., Ore., Tenn., N. Mex. Cf. however N. Mex. Laws 1934, Sp. Sess., C. 26, which provides that in
suits brought after March x5th of any year the mortgagor (erroneously "mortgagee" in act) may not be
dispossessed from farm land until the crop is harvested, unless the instrument provide otherwise.
'4For a statutory example, see infra note 69.
'The-South

Carolina Legislature in 1932 (Laws 1932, no. 877) made use of this device obviously

for the purpose suggested by enacting a simple statute providing that tho bidding at a judicial sale shall
remain open for a period of thirty days, during which the bid may be raised by any person other than
the mortgagee.
"A conventional statement of the law is given in 6 R. C. L. 365 (1915): "The general rule is that the
law in force at the time a mortgage is. executed, with all the conditions and limitations it imposes, is the
law which determines the force and effect of a mortgage."
633 JoNEs, MORTGAGES 51694 and cases cited.
'4MmN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§9626, 9643.
'Orr v. Bennett, 135 Minn. 443, 161 N. W. 165 (1917).
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indebtedness at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed and determined and
."" And one recalls that it is in this requirement of the
ordered by the courts; ....
act and the limitation on its own existence that the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Blaisdell case found its main support for a judgment of constitutional validity.
The phrase in the emergency amendment is that "all or a reasonable part of such
income or rental value" shall be applied on the mortgage debt. And this would
seem to permit a wide judicial discretion in determining the proportion of income
to be applied on the debt; and a number of the state courts have so construed the
language. In South Dakota, however, the Supreme Court has held that the legislature in using these words "intended that the full value of the possession should be
received by the mortgagee in every case, from one source or another." And an order
"directing the payment of less than all of the income or rental value" would receive
the court's approval only on a "showing that the mortgagee had received or would
thereafter receive the remainder of such value from some source other than through
a direct payment of the rental or income." 67
Moreover, this device has not altogether escaped the ban of unconstitutionality
68
In this
though it is not by way of the contracts clause that it has been applied.
context the technique of constitutional denial adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court
is as interesting as it is rare. In that state the owner-debtor is given the right to
redeem property sold under execution or order of sale within 18 months from the
date of the sale and in the meantime he is entitled to possession of the property rentfree."9
In i933 by joint resolution 70 a moratorium was declared "upon all periods of redemption from judicial sales which were running at the beginning of the present
emergency created by the bank moratorium under federal order and which expire
during the moratorium as defined in section 2 hereof." Section 2 limited the extension to six months with an authority to the governor to renew it for a like period.
The governor exercised this power 71 and before the period lapsed, a special session
of the legislature again renewed the moratorium to March I, 1935.72 In 1935 the
legislature once more extended the period, this time fixing its terminus at January 15,
1937.73 Under all these acts the debtor was required to pay the reasonable income or
rental value of the property, default for 30 days extinguishing his rights.

'Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339.
"Lund v. Eggleston, 279 N. W. 546 (S.D. 1938).
"The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 63 N. D. 514, 249 N. W.
118 (933)

held its statute unconstitutional as violative of the contracts and due process clauses. The

decision was rendered, however, prior to the Blaisdell case and following this decision the legislature
reenacted another and more embracive statute in 1935 (Laws N. D., c. 242), and in 1937 this was continued. Laws 1937, c. Y61.
7'
Kan. Laws 1933, c. 232.,
I KAN. GEzN. STAT. (1935) §60-3439.
'
This was interpreted as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power which rendered that part
of the act invalid in the cases of Oakland State Bank v. Bowlin, 141 Kan. 126, 40 P. (2d) 437 (1935),
and Langworthy v. Kadel, 141 Kan. 250, 40 P. (2d) 443 (935).
"Kan. Laws 1934, Sp. Sess., C.3.
" Kan. Laws 1935, c. 226. Kan. Laws 1935, c. 225 provided an automatic extension of periods of
redemption to March 1, 1935.

528

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The 1935 act became effective on March i and shortly mortgage debtors who had

been enjoying the substantial respite afforded by the previous moratoria began taking
the necessary steps to assure themselves of the new dispensation provided by its
terms. Five such, whose properties had been sold under foreclosure during 1932 and
1933, on petition to the court obtained extensions of their redemption periods until
January 15, 1937. Whereupon there seems to have occurred a simultaneous collapse
of the patience of the mortgagees who had taken no objection to the previously
granted stays. With one accord they now appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court
for relief from what they considered an imposition on their indulgence. Their
appeals 74 resulted in a decision declaring the 1935 act unconstitutional and establishing an authority on the basis of which 24 cases were reversed the same day.
Inspiration for this "crack down" was drawn from an 893 Kansas decision but
mainly from an opinion of a federal district judge construing the moratorium of
19347 in which it was said: "To uphold and enforce the Mortgage Moratorium Law
of this state passed after rights of these parties had been finally settled by orders and
decrees, as against this fixed and settled law of this case, would be in direct conflict
with the settled law of both the state and the nation, would be unconstitutional and
void as against the fundamental law of the land and the absolute rights of the
parties as determined *before the Act of the legislature relied upon was enacted." 76
In quoting with approval this language, the Supreme Court of Kansas said: "We
are not willing to yield the unbroken record of this court and most other courts in
favor of the judgment of a competent court of record being res adjudicata and not
subject to annulment or being set aside by a subsequent act of the Legislature, even
on the theory of the existence of an emergency, especially when that emergency is a
continuation of four consecutive ones culminating in a total extension of nearly four
years."177 Thus the legislative redemption extension passed by the 1935 act was declared invalid as an attempt on the part of the legislature to alter an order of court
from which no appeal had been taken and which by that fact had become res
7s
adjudicata.
The net effect of this holding was to restrict the operation of each act to decrees
rendered after its enactment, an indulgence of no value for, as we have noted, the
normal redemption period in Kansas was i8 months.
Since attorney's fees incurred in foreclosure are not infrequently taxed as part
of the costs payable by the redeeming mortgagor, it is of interest to note that two
-'Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Anthony, and four other cases, 142 Kan. 670, 52 P. (2d) 1208 (935).
SSupra note 72.
7'Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dewey, 8 F. Supp. 678, 679 (D. Kan. 1934).
Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Anthony, and four other cases, 142 Kan. 670, 68o, 52 P. (2d) 1o8,
1213 (1935).
"-Apparently, however, the orders of extension are not so "void" that the mortgagee may recover the
income or the reasonable rental value which the mortgagor had retained during the extended redemption
period. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Slentz, 145 Kan. 849, 67 P. (2d) 522 (1937); Union Central Life Ins.
Co. v. Pletcher, 144 Kan. 359, 58 P. (2d) I158 (1936).
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states, Idaho and North Dakota, have sought to impose a control on the amount of
79
the fee charged.
THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT

The legislative and judicial history of the mortgage as a credit instrument reflects,
in the long view, a tendency more favorable to the debtor than to the creditor. As
an incident of this trend we observe the appearance of the procedure of foreclosure
by judicial sale which has as its justification the assurance to the mortgagor of the
surplus over the mortgage debt which the sale of the property brings. Yet this confers on the mortgagor a right which is valuable only when it is not needed-in an
expanding market.80 In a period of abnormal deflation the judicial sale of property
mortgaged during a period of prosperity will likely produce not a surplus but a
deficit. And as the surplus is payable to the mortgagor, so the deficit is payable by
the mortgagor. For the primary credit obligation is the note to which the mortgage
is merely security; and if full payment of the note is not accomplished by the sale
of the security, the creditor is entitled to look to other assets of the debtor for satisfaction. These "other assets" are subjected to the payment of the unpaid portion of
his debt by a deficiency judgment which is measured by the difference between the
sale price and the amount of the debt. And so the judicial sale, dependent for its
effective operation upon a normal market and competitive bidding, in a period which
furnishes no buyers-and so no bidders-may become an instrument of oppression
by which the mortgagee may be treated to a windfall and the mortgagor made to
pay his debt twofold. There is in fact no hint of the unusual in the many judicial
sales held throughout the country during the first few years of the depression at
which the single bidder was the mortgagee to whom the auctioneer, after a futile
effort to whip up a bidding enthusiasm among the few other mortgagees present,
knocked down property worth thousands of dollars on a bid of a mere $ioo. s l
"An Idaho statute of '937 (Laws 1937, c. 64) which repeals similar acts passed in 1935 (Laws
1935, cc. 7, so6) stipulates that redemption may be accomplished by "paying the purchaser the amount

of his purchase with interest at six per cent (a reduction froth a former ten per cent), taxes and attorney's
fees . . . " which must be "proven by affidavits of the attorney who has received and the person who has
paid the fee.
The action taken by the North Dakota legislature in 1933 may foreshadow a general movement for
legislative control of attorney's fees charged in simple mortgage foreclosures. For that year the legislature
reduced the attorney's fee taxable a's costs to $25 which-somewhat gratuitously-he was denied the
right to split with his client (Laws 1933, c. 154). Not only so. To collect this amount the good faith of
his employment had to be proved. By the 1937 amendment (N. D. Laws 1937, c. 16o) the right to a fee
was limited to a resident lawyer of the state. And the strain on his honesty is relieved by omitting proof
of good faith--simply making the violation of the statute a misdemeanor.
'I If the property may be sold at a profit or for an excess over the mortgage debt, this may be better
done at private sale by the mortgagor who may thus liquidate his debt. Accordingly as a device to
preserve the debtor's equity in the mortgaged property, one may assume that the judicial sale rarely
functions.
'In Federal Title & Mtge. Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, s66 At. 538 (1933), the
Chancellor notes that on the date of the sale of the property therein involved there were 29 sales foreclosing first mortgages. His tabulation shows that the decrees fixing the amounts due ranged from a low of
$2,902.44 to a high of $4,787.36. Yet with the exception of one bid of $5,8oo.oo against a decree of
$8,475.77 (and two bids at $2oo and $6oo), all the properties were knocked down on bids of $xoo.oo.
And he continues: "The record of sheriff's sales above recited and-which is but a fair example of everyday
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It would seem that a court which had set itself a precedent for inventiveness in
the creation of the equity of redemption to relieve against the forfeiture of a mortgagor's land would not doubt its authority to deal with the inequities inherent in
the situation just alluded to. But this tradition of the early English Chancellor seems
not to have been generally inherited by his contemporary American counterpart.
Since, however, the sale's validity depends upon its confirmation by the court, a
measure of control is permitted within the framework of orthodox equity doctrine.
Confirmation may be withheld if the bid is so low as to "shock the conscience of the
court. 's2 It is impossible to say just what disparity between value and bid price will
provide the necessary shock. But "mere inadequacy of the price bid at the sale is
not sufficient to authorize the trial court to refuse to give its approval."8 3 True, "If
there are other things in addition to inadequacy of price the court may refuse to
confirm." But "General conditions resulting from the economic situation which has
prevailed for the past few years is not a sufficient fact or circumstance, in addition
to inadequacy of price, to justify a refusal to confirm" 8 4 And even so, this power of
the court has been confined to ordering a new sale at which it is assumed a fair
price will be obtained. It is hardly likely, however, that if the unconfirmed sale
produced only a single bidder-the mortgagee-he can be induced to raise his bid
at the second sale unless competition compels it. Accordingly the result of judicial
intervention at this point may be simply to add the costs of successive sales to the
mortgagor's debt.
Some courts, it is true, have borrowed from equity receivership practice the fixing
of an "upset price" and have applied this to the simple mortgage foreclosure procedure.8 8 But again unless the upset price is bid, the court has no alternative but to
order a resale and thus increase the costs. Indeed these techniques invoked in the
debtor's interest may help him litde if at all. Accordingly, we have a few courts,
unwilling to be hemmed in by the inadequacy of old formulas and at the same time
denying their dependence on legislative authority, which have broken through the
conventional equity idiom and have asserted for themselves an inherent competence
to deal with the new demands of this period.
occurrences throughout the country, speaks eloquently of present day conditions and of which the court
takes judicial notice..
"
'For a typical statement of the principle, see the recent case of Fox v. Nelson, 133 Neb. 903, 277
N. W. 795 (1938) in which a number of supporting authorities are cited.
' Washington Mutual Savings Bk. v. Horn, z86 Wash. 75, 56 P. (2d) 995 (1936); 3 JoNEs, MonLTGArs, §2xo8, in support of a statement in the text to the same effect, lists a number of cases from the
various state courts.

84
Washington Mutual Savings Bk. v. Horn, 186 Wash. 75, 56 P. (2d) 995 (1936). See also Bolich v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335 (932), in which the court answers in the negative its
question: "Does the depression or unprecedented scarcity of money for ordinary transactions or enforced
stagnation of the real estate market constitute an equity sufficient to warrant a court in restraining the
exercise of the power of sale in a trust deed?" Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co., 138 Mo. 17, 39
S. W. 465 (1897) in which the court says: "However strong our sympathies may be enlisted for the
unfortunate victim of hard times, they cannot furnish a basis for equity jurisdiction; and such courts
cannot and ought not to be made the instruments of speculation in the future values of property even for
the benefit of the unfortunate." See also Nelsen v. Doll, 124 Neb. 523, 247 N. W. 44 (s933).
'Wilson v. Fouke, 188 Ark. 8xi, 67 S. W. (2d) 1030 (1934).
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The most notable example of this assertiveness is that reflected in the decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case of Suring State Bank v. Giese.88 Here the
trial court had refused to confirm a sale of property mortgaged for $2,ooo and bid in
by the mortgagee for $6oo, except on the condition that a deficiency judgment against
the mortgagor be denied. In upholding this decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted a "power of a court of equity, without the aid of statute, to take one or all of

three steps for the protection of the parties and the promotion of a fair solution of
the difficulties." The first two-refusal to confirm a "substantially inadequate" bid

and fixation of an upset price--though somewhat unusual, were conventional enough
and, as has already been suggested, accomplished little in the debtor's interest. The
third, however, moves toward a much less common procedure. It is said that the
court in fixing the "upset price" may conduct a hearing, establish the value of the
property (in which "usefulness" and "future value" must be given weight) and, "as

a condition to confirmation, require that the fair value of the property be credited
upon the foreclosure judgment."''

7

And, although the plaintiff is entitled to reject

this condition and thus force a resale, the delay and expense of this alternative should
go far toward making hipn amenable, especially in view of the risk that the court
might deny confirmation to the resale.

Had the courts taken the lead furnished by this decision,88 it is possible that the
many deficiency judgment statutes designed to accomplish the same purpose-and
largely by the same procedure-would never have been enacted. Almost all, however, referred to the case only to repudiate it and hurriedly retreat to the safety of

more orthodox authority 8 9 And so the legislatures of a number of the states turned
'*21o Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (I933)- See notes (1933) 42 YM.A L. J. 960; (i933) 27 ILL. L. Rv.
950.

'Suring State Bk. v. Giese, 210 Wis. at 493, 246 N. W. at 558.
s'Even the Wisconsin court seems to have become frightened by its own forthrightness. See the following subsequent decisions: Northwestern Loan & Trust Co. v. Bidinger, 226 Wis. 239, 276 N. W. 645
(937); Weimer v. Uthus, 217 Wis. 56, 258 N. W. 358 (1935). And see, Stone, Mortgage Moratoria
(1936) x Wis. L. Rav. 203, 216 and note.
'aMorris v. Waite, 119 Fla. 3, i6o So. 516 (1935); Federal Land Bank v. Crombie, 258 Ky. 383, 80
S. W. (2d) 39 (1935); United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Neuman, 113 N. J. Eq. 244, 166 At. 537 (1933);
Federal Title & Mtge. Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, supra note 81 (1933); Mellen v. Edwards, 179 Wash.
Comm'rs of Land Office v. Harrower, 167 Okla. 269, 29 P. (2d)
272, 37 P. (2d) 203 (1934); State ex rel.
123 (1934); Clinton v. First Nat. Co., i8o Okla. 410, 70 P. (2d) 61 (1937). In Kenly v. Huntingdon
Bldg. Ass'n, Inc., 166 Md. 182, 57o At. 526 (1934), the court said: "It seems to us that it is not for the
courts to adopt a moratorium for the legal rights of litigants." And in Provident Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Pekarek, 52 Ohio App. 492, 3 N. E. (2d) 983 (1936), repudiation of the Suring case was on the ground
that: "The Chancellor's powers are not so broad as that of an autocrat. His powers in this advanced and
enlightened age of jurisprudence are somewhat limited." The Mississippi Supreme Court in Standard
Lbr. & Mfg. Co. v. Deposit Guaranty Bk. & Trust Co., 169 Miss. 120, 152 So. 639 0934), in declining
to adopt the principle of the Suring case, observed: "Equity does not violate the law nor treat valid contracts as scraps of paper, nor raise a shield to accomplish that end; if it did, in times such as we now
confront, its halls would be overcrowded and statesmen would not need to wrestle with its problems:'
Cf., however, Farmers etc. Savings Bk. v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271 N. Y. Supp. 306 (1934), in
which the Suring case is followed. It was likewise followed in Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda
Corp., 147 Misc. 374, 265 N. Y. Supp. XI5 (1933), a case which, however, was reversed sub nom.
Jewett v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 241 App. Div. 131, 271 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1934), appeal dismissed,
267 N. Y. 554, 196 N. E. 576 (1935).
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their attention to the problem, setting up acts to sanction judicial control which the
courts had refused to assert for themselves.
Some of these acts have taken the procedure of the upset price made somewhat
more respectable for simple mortgage foreclosures by the Suring case and have provided that the price so fixed or the "fair value" be credited on the judgment. Under
this procedure the difference between a figure judicially determined-not the sale
price-and the mortgaged debt measures the plaintiff's recovery. 0
The deficiency judgment laws enacted during this period reflect an unusual uniformity both of form and technique. They adopt either the device of the upset price,
which is also made the basis of a credit on the foreclosure judgment, or they provide
for the determination of the "fair value" of the property, and require that this be so
credited.
The typical language of these acts permits the court in ordering the sale to "take
judicial notice of economic conditions and after a proper hearing fix a minimum or
upset price at which the mortgaged premises must be bid or sold before confirmation
of the sale." Or on a motion to confirm the sale the court may conduct a hearing to
establish the value of the property and require, as a condition to the confirmation,
that such value be credited on the judgment. And in determining this "fair value"
the court may call to its assistance testimony or sworn appraisals by disinterested
experts.
Nearly all invoke as their major premise the emergency created by the depression.
But not all have a time limitation comparable to the moratory acts. Those which do,
form a part of the general moratorium scheme and are made to expire simultaneously
with the general act. New York's act is of this type and its constitutionality has been
grounded in its temporary character."' The constitutionality of the Alabama act is
similarly rationalized. 92 Many of the acts, however, are not so limited. Accordingly,
unless they are subsequently repealed or otherwise consigned to the legal limbo by
the courts they will constitute a permanent addition to the foreclosure procedure.
Not a few states have specifically exempted instruments executed to the federal
government or any of its credit agencies from the operation of their moratory laws,
including the deficiency judgment provisions. Indeed, fear lest mortgage relief funds
be withheld led the California legislature, by joint resolution, to have inquiry made
3
as to the effect of a proposed deficiency judgment act on federal policy.
'aIdaho,

having followed the conventional method in its 1933 act (Laws 1933, C. 150) limiting the

deficiency to the difference between "fair value" and the mortgage debt, in its 1937 act (Laws 1937, C.
31) spurns these niceties of procedural formality and forthrightly and simply destroys dcficicncy judgments
by denying its courts jurisdiction over them. See also Neb. Laws 1933, C. 41; N. D. Laws 1937, C. 159

in which, at §4, the legislature delivers this ultimatum: "If the courts declare this act unconstitutional
insofar as it relates to mortgages or contracts in existence at the time of taking effect of the Act, they
shall never consider its constitutionality with reference to mortgages or contracts entered into after the
date when this Act becomes effective."
' Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 19o N. E. 324 (1934).
'Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Moore, 232 Ala. 488, 169 So. 1 (1936).
'The California Assembly adopted an unusual method of ascertaining the extent to which federal
funds might take flight as a result of the enactment of a proposed act abolishing deficiency judgments.
By Joint Resolution No. 33, filed with the Secretary of State March 15, 1937, Cal. Stat. 1937, Res. 41, the
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By making these acts retroactive in their operation the legislatures have thrown
them squarely into the teeth of the contracts clause of the Constitution. It is not sur-

prising, therefore, that at this point we find the highest constitutional mortality. The
effect of a decision of unconstitutionality is generally to render the act impotent only
so far as existing contracts are concerned-uncurtailed control of mortgages executed
after the effective date being permitted. But a few courts have refused to allow even
this narrowed competence. The Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, after vetoing
the deficiency judgment act of the 1933 legislature9 4 as being violative of the contracts clause, went on to hold, by construction, that as to instruments executed after
the date of the act it has no applicability.9 5
The West Virginia Supreme Court in its zeal to defend all mortgages-present
and future-from legislative officiousness, has taken the unique position that the

deficiency judgment act of its legislature9 6 constituted an effort by the legislature to
impose on the circuit courts "a function nonjudicial in its nature and therefore hot

within the powers of those courts as defined in the Constitutiop." Article 8 of the
Constitution provides that the courts "shall have such other jurisdiction, whether
supervisory, original, appellate, or concurrent as is or may be prescribed by law."
But the court said that these "supervisory powers can be only exercised over matters
juridical" and that such a matter is not presented when, on petition for confirmation

of a sale, the court is required to determine the adequacy of the price.97
The Pennsylvania deficiency judgment act has likewise been permanently interred though the judicial requiem is varied. The acts. of 1934 and 193598 were invalidated as impairing the obligations of preexisting contracts.99 Point was also
made of the violation of the special legislation clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 10 0 but the court declined to consider its pertinence. Consideration was given to
this point in 1938 when the court decided that as to mortgages executed after its date,
the acts were declared unconstitutional on this ground. 10 ' And for the same reason
federal credit agencies were requested to advise the legislature "whether or not in their opinion the
adoption of legislation . . . abolishing deficiency judgments would have a tendency to hamper . . . or
prevent the continued granting of the Federal Land Bank, etc., to the citizens of the state of California;
.The board of the HOLC through its general counsel replied under date of April 2, 1937, express.
ing the belief "that such deficiency judgment legislation as you refer to is unwise public policy, puts
obstacles in the way of the family deciding to acquire a home, and should be avoided.... " "The
deficiency judgment evil consisted of the wrong which resulted from auction block sales on a bid not
representing fair value at all but a mere nominal amount and the taking of a deficiency for the remainder
of the debt after the mortgagee had taken the property for such nominal value. This situation is avoided
by the law now on the books in California requiring that full credit for the full, fair value of the
property be given at the foreclosure sale and the deficiency judgment be taken only for the remainder..
"4Laws 1933, act no. 57.
Laws 1933, c. 34.
'Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933).
'Staud v. Sill, iI4 W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (933), followed by Buckeye Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Smith, X14 W. Va. 284, 171 S. E. 65o (1933).
'Pa. Laws 1934, Sp. Sess., no. 243; Laws 1935, no. 503.
' Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winovich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 At. 481 (1936); Shallcross v.
North Branch Sedgwick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, L23 Pa. Super. 593, 187 At. 819 (1936).
02Art. 3, §7, as follows: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law . . . providing
or changing methods for collecting of debts or the enforcing of judgments or prescribing the effect of
' HOLC v. Edwards, 198 At. 123 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1938).
judicial sales of real estate."
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the judicial veto was also applied to the 1937 deficiency judgment act. 102 The court
could find no justification for a classification which excepted land banks and the

Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation from the provisions of the act. Nor could the
court justify different treatment for mortgage judgment Ereditors and other judgment creditors. Accordingly, the act was invalidated. 10 3
The casualty list does not, however, include all of the deficiency judgment laws
which the legislatures have passed during this period. There is one conspicuous
survivor whose validity has been upheld not only as to mortgages made since its
date but also to those which were executed previously. The act is that of North
Carolina, passed in 1933'04 And the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
in Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corporation v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Company, 0 5 establishing its validity, may well point the direction which later state court
decisions will take. 0°
By the terms of this act, if the obligee is the purchaser at the sale and sues for a
deficiency, the defendant is permitted to show "as a matter of defense and set-off...
that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured by it . . . "
and so "defeat or off-set any deficiency judgment against him in whole or in part."
And in approving this statute the Court said: "The contract contemplated that the
lender should make itself whole, if necessary, out of the security, but not that it
should be enriched at the expense of the borrower or realize more than would repay
the loan with interest ......
The mandate of the statute is that the property's "fair worth" be determined by
the court and this phrase or its synonym "fair value" recurs throughout the statutes.
Obviously to require the imposition of a "fair value" standard to foreclosure sales
implies at once the existence of such a standard and its availability to the judge
charged with applying it. "Market value" is irrelevant for, with the exception of
forced sales, there has generally been no market; and this has also meant that the
fixation of value by the bargaining of the free-from-compulsion seller and the freefrom-compulsion buyer has largely ceased to function. Nor is the highest bid at the
judicial sale of more assistance. Here the presence of competitive bidding and a
normal market are the guarantee of an accurate value. It is, of course, a recognition
of the absence of these factors which has led to the statutes in question. Certainly
the bid price may be taken into consideration by the judge in fixing the "fair value";
but it must remain to other circumstances to carry the burden of evaluation.
A recital of these commonplaces merely serves to accentuate the anomaly of a
"true value" concept as distinguished from "market value" in a price economy. 107
"mPennsylvania Company v. Scott, x98 Ad. 115 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1938).
',See
notes (x937) 86 U. oF PA. L. REV. 295, and (938) 4 U. oF PiTTs. L. REV. 242.
" N. C. Laws 1933, C. 275.
US300 U. S. 124 (1937).
' Cf., however, Federal Land Bank v. Garrison, 185 S. C. 255, 193 S. E. 308 (937), in which the
court adverted to Richmond Loan & Mtge. Corp. v. Wachovia Bk. & Trust Co., 300 U. S. 124 (1937), but

declined to approve the South Carolina deficiency judgment act nonetheless. See also Alert Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Bechtold, xgg Atl. 734 (N. J. Ct. Errors & App. 1938).
'"See 2 BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATIox oF PRopERTy (1937) 837-848.
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But anomalous or not, the judicial obligation is clear. From some source the
hypothetical must be translate4 into the practical stuff of everyday court judgment.
Or as one judge has put it, "The question is a difficult one but nevertheless must be
determined."1 0 8
A formula of the New York court includes "evidence of the age and construction
of the buildings on the premises, the rent received therefor, assessed valuation, location, condition of repair, the sale price of property of a similar nature in the neighborhood, . .. accessibility and all other elements which may fairly be considered as
affecting the market value....

109 And the court adds "with such evidence the

trial court in the exercise of its best judgment should determine the market value ...
in the existing circumstances." 1 True, the same court in 1934 had observed that
there is "no market value of real estate of any kind."'' But this, the 'court reminds
us, was said in considering the constitutionality of the deficiency judgment act and
"has no application to the question" of determining the standard of value required
12
by its terms
Other factors have been added, such as "expectation of the return, in the not
distant future, of a fairly normal market.... ",13 And it is in the same context
that
that the court urges "the longer view ...in order to arrive at a 'normal value'
114
avoids the pitfalls of inflation on the one hand and of deflation on the other."
These subjective factors must undoubtedly weigh heavily in the balance struck,
although they may represent nothing more than judicial wishful thinking or sentiment for the traditionally imposed-on debtor who cannot help himself. But in any
event if the mortgagee is to be repaid his investment from the security which he
holds, it is the market-present or future-which must support that payment. That
the market will generally recover sufficiently to overcome depreciation and debt
accumulation so that the mortgagee will thus be made whole, one may be permitted
a doubt. There can be no doubt, however, that the "fair value" device, if the market
Exchange Bk. Trust Co. v. Ekenberg, 161 Misc. 62, 66, 292 N. Y. Supp. 142, 146 (1936).
Illustrative of the gymnastics of guessing implicit in a judicial determination of "fair value" is the following: In Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bk. v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271 N. .Y. Supp. 306
(1934), the trial judge fixed an upset price of $25,000. The amount due on plaintiff's mortgage was
$32,449.75. He bid in the property at the sale at $25,000, the upset price. The question of the deficiency
judgment was not determined and this question is before the court in the decision reported in 153 Misc.
554, 276 N. Y. Supp. 246 0934). The judge determined the "fair and reasonable market value" by
affidavits filed in the case. The officers of plaintiff insisted that "the property is not worth over $25,oo.
The values as shown by the affidavits of the defendant, however, were respectively $48,000,
$53,426, $45,000, "over $5o,oo"; and that fixed by "an appraiser for the HOLC" was $55,192. The
trial judge after "a careful examination of the affidavits submitted on behalf of the defendants" decided
that "all things necessary for a fair valuation of the property have been considered by said appraisers" and
determined that "the fair market value of the property at the present time is not less than $45,000, or
over $7,oo0 more than all of plaintiffs claims...." And accordingly the deficiency judgment was
denied.
'Heiman v. Bishop, 272 N. Y. 83, 88, 4 N. E. (2d) 944, 946 (1936).
'Id, at 88, 4 N. E. (2d) at 946.
o
2
Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 19 N. E. 324, 326 (1934).
" Heiman v. Bishop, supra note io9.
Corn Exchange Bank Trust Company v. Ekenberg, 161 Misc. at 66, 292 N. Y. Supp. at 146.
"'Ibid.

'Corn
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fails to stage this comeback, has effected a sharing of the loss between mortgagee and
mortgagor by imposing a capital levy on the former and placing this to the credit of
the latter.
Had it not been for the constitutional inhibition of the contracts clause it is likely
that popular resentment against the many unconscionable deficiency judgments of
the period wopld have shown itself in statutes abolishing this right altogether.""f
The deficiency judgment statutes passed have, in form at least, stopped short of this
drastic step. Instead, they have set up this "fair value" device, as one court has said,
"to bring both mortgagor and mortgagee within the spirit of equity." 0 And even
in this form, as to preexisting debts, with little exception the laws have been struck
down. One recalls, however, that these statutes are not temporary by their terms and
as to mortgages executed after their date, their control is uncurtailed. Accordingly,
they may represent the one permanent deposit of this period in the field of mortgage
legislation.
The moratorium, on the other hand, avoids the problem of valuation by postponing it. But by adopting this course the legislatures have not thereby eliminated all
the mortgage problems even for the present. Rather, they have created others hardly
less burdensome which have been deflected into the laps of the judiciary. For relief
is dispensed to the mortgagor through the medium of a court decree and while the
statutes usually go no further than to require that taxes and reasonable payments on
the debt condition a moratorium, the judges have proceeded on the assumptions that
this does not require an.automatic injunction against all foreclosure suits but only
those in which the mortgagor shows himself worthy of relief. And, as we have seen,
this duty to discriminate between the deserving mortgagor and his unworthy brother
has conferred on the trial judge a degree of paternalism hitherto unknown to the
mortgage relationship.
The policy of evasion which underlies the moratorium rests, of course, on the
assumption that the economic condition which invoked legislative intrusion into the
field of private contracts is merely temporary. Accordingly, if the mortgagor'be tided
over the present "crisis" the return of normal "good times" will solve his problems
for him. Most are agreed, however, that such a prosperity is not now with us, and
the extension of existing moratory legislation by some of the states into 1940 suggests
no rosy optimism as to its early return.
While it would be fatuous to assert that the moratorium solves no prolems,117
'See Report of the loint Legislative Committee on Mortgage Moratorium and Deficiency Judgments to
the Legislature,
Jan. 3r, z938, N. Y. LEGIs. Doe. (1938) No. 58, p. 358

' City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Combined Real Estate Interests, 149 Misc. 742, 268 N. Y. Supp.

150 (1933).

-'The mortgagor to whom in the meantime the moratorium has assured a home would surcl7 disagree. So also would the farmer whose land has thus been saved to him. And for those who because of
the respire have been able to refinance through the HOLW or other federal agencies, the laws have provided a real solution to a financial problem. Not only so. The reluctant mortgagee on whom the
moratorium has imposed a debt holiday is in a more receptive mood to the suggestion of his mortgagor
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it is nevertheless true that these statutes in a real sense merely temporize with a

financial pathology. And this has given rise to the question, after the moratoriumwhat?"1 8 There are those who insist that the shock of a sudden termination of the
moratory stay on a real estate market already punch drunk from the depression
would be more than it could stand. And to temper the impact it is suggested that

during an extended moratory period the principal of existing mortgages be amortized
at the rate of at least two or three per cent per year."') But in most of the states now
operating under moratory legislation the statutes have been in existence since 1932
or 1933. And by the time the present laws expire it is likely that in many cases it
will be found that depreciation plus deflation has so widened the gap between the

security's value and the loan that amortization on such a scale can never close it.
Adjustment on a current market value basis would seemingly demand, therefore,
curtailment at a much higher rate; and this, it is objected, cannot now be man20
aged.
But will such a deflation result? The effect of wholesale foreclosures particularly
in metropolitan districts would certainly be expected to produce this result. However, it will be recalled that there have been not a few states whose moratory statutes
have lapsed. Whether this has resulted in a precipitate deflation of real estate values
we do not know. Yet if the consequence had been as serious-as that pictured by those
advocates of indefinite extension, it may be assumed that the legislatures in the states
concerned would have rapidly moved to reenact their moratoria. There seems to
be no such movement.
To raise these questions is to make it apparent that no a priori answers may be
had. Sooner or later some state like New York in which the mortgage problem has
been most acute, and which on account of this fact has been holding back, must lift
its moratorium. And the resultant experience will doubtless determine whether the
others will follow or continue the present dilatory course until either inflation bails
out the mortgagor or gradual liquidation reduces mortgage debt structures to
workable dimensions.
For the latter alternative the new provisions of the Bankruptcy Act on Real
Property Arrangements by Persons Other Than Corporations are available but offer
no great promise' 2 ' The principal purpose served by this new addition to the
Bankruptcy Act is to afford the same relief to individual debtors as was formerly
available to corporations under old Section 7 7b. By its terms both secured and unsecured.debts may be scaled down under a rehabilitation plan. But the fact that
confirmation is conditioned upon acceptance "by the creditors of each class holding
22
two-thirds in amount of the debts of guch class affected by the arrangement"'
that lower interest and even a reduction of the principal of his obligation be granted in consideration for
getting rid of this legislative intrusion.
raThe problem seemed ominous even in 1934. See Mischler, After the Moratorium-What? (1934)
i9 IowA L. REv. 56o. For a statement of the issue in a more recent context, see Report of the Joint
Legislative Committee, supra note 115, at 32 et seq. and 77 et seq.
2"Id. at 43.
'Id. at 30, 31.
'Pub. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
'm Id. §468(1).
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means that the scaling of a mortgage indebtedness-if there is only one such in the
debtor's schedule-may be accomplished only with the consent of the mortgagee
involved. The promise of a more permanent debt revision and so a better chance
of collecting on his security might induce a mortgage creditor so situated to agree to
reduce his mortgage. Otherwise for the single mortgage.debtor the new act offers
no relief. Certain it is, however, that recourse to this procedure with a general
scaling down of all obligations including mortgages should go a long way toward
cushioning the impact of a wholesale foreclosure deflation.
The legislative liquidation of moratory acts now under way is regarded by some
as affording occasion for provision of better laws relating to mortgages and foreclosures. In this legislative program the accent is on streamlining foreclosure procedure to step up its speed and cut its cost. And while this is primarily in the
mortgagee's interest, it is said that the mortgagor will also profit because with an
assurance of a rapid recovery of his principal the mortgagee will lend more money
on less security at lower interest. But if the horse and buggy procedure in which
we rode into the depression required the application of a legislative brake, one may
well imagine how its more modern successor would fare in some future depression.
Indeed, if recent experience means anything, it would seem that such procedure will
likely survive the shoc k of depression only if elements of flexibility are introduced
into the mortgagor's obligation or if the federal agencies which were set up after the
event to provide financial relief to mortgagors and mortgagees in the present period
are continued and expanded so as to anticipate this function in a future crisis.
APPENDix

In this appendix reference is made to the state legislation enacted for the relief of
mortgage debtors in the period of i93i-i938. Those statutes immediately directed to this
objective have been included irrespective of whether they represent temporary emergency
legislation or permanent additions to the mortgage laws of the enacting ptates. Statutes on
collateral matters as, for example, acts postponing foreclosure of tax liens, although subserving the same general end, have been excluded. No attempt has been made to portray
the statutory evolution in detail. The statements digesting the statutes indicate the latest
stage in the development of the law and, in a number of instances, the content of earlier
acts which have been superseded. Leading cases on constitutional issues and a few other
decisions of interest on points raised by the acts have been noted.
In digesting the laws, accuracy and completeness of statement have been sacrificed to
some degree in the interests of brevity, since the purpose of this collection is to provide
merely a general indication of the legislative trend and a convenient reference for those
who wish to pursue the subject in the statute books themselves. 1 Because statutory compilations obscure year-by-year developments, citations have been given exclusively to the
session laws.
Where the statutes have specified the dates of their termination, these have been indicated. No attempt has been made to indicate with precision the types of instruments
which are subject to their terms although some variation on this point may be found
1

A valuable compilation of comparable scope is Bridewell, Digest of State Moratorium Leghlation and
Judicid Interpretation of Saint, U. S. CENTRaL HouING Com.., Spec. Rep. No. 1, app. I (936).
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among the statutes. A number of acts exclude from their operation mortgages held by
the United States, its agencies and instrumentalities. Acts containing such provisions have
been noted by appending an asterisk to the reference, although, again, caution must be
given against certain variations in the exclusionary provisions. Not a few acts except mortgages given as security for public debts, an exception which, though not noted in the
digests, is most frequently found in connection with the exception mentioned above. Frequently provision is made that the acts apply only to mortgages executed before a specified
date, Such dates are indicated, but not the provision often accompanying them to the
effect that mortgages otherwise subject to the act are excepted if extended or renewed for
more than a year beyond the date given.
No legislation deemed appropriate for inclusion has been found in the laws of the
following states: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
ALABAMA. DEFIcIENcY JUDGMENTS. Laws 1935, act no. 146. Expires Oct. 1, 1939. Actions on
debts secured by mortgages must, on motion, be stayed until foreclosure. Debtor may set off "fair and
reasonable market value" of security. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Moore, 232 Ala. 488, 169 So. 1
(1936): act constitutional during emergency. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Joseph, 234 Ala. 271,
175 So. 275 (1937): plea involving act demurrable unless it shows continuance of emergency.
ARIZONA. MORATORIUMa. Laws 1933, C. 29; Laws 1935, c. 9; Laws 1937, c. 8; Laws 1937, 2d Sp. Sess.,
c. 17. Applies to mortgages made before March 4, 1933. Expires March 4, 1939. Court may continue
foreclosures but not beyond March 4, 1939. In default cases mortgagor or mortgagee within so days
after judgments, may obtain court order permitting mortgagor to remain in possession, fixing "fair rental"
which is paid to the clerk of court and applied by him on taxes, cost of maintenance, etc.
DsFaCIENcY JUDOMENTS. Laws 1933, c. 88. Not permitted unless mortgagee can prove that at time
mortgage made value of security did not exceed amount remaining due. If proven, only entitled to judgment for difference between value as found by court or jury and amount due. Kresos V. White, 47 Ariz.
175, 54 P. (2d) 800 (1936): unconstitutional as impairment of contract. Perkins v. First Nat. Bk., 47
Ariz. 376, 56 P. (2d) 639 (1936): act valid as to subsequent mortgages.

ARKANSAS. MoRATotUM. Laws 1933, act 21; Laws 1935, act 49; Laws 1937, act 221. Applies to

mortgages made before Jan. 1, 1933. Answers in foreclosure suits not due until three months after
service. In fixing date of sale or confirming sale, court to consider debtor's condition, economic conditions, and fair price of property. Resale to be ordered if better price obtainable upon agreement to bid
substantially higher. Wilson v. Fouke, x88 Ark. 811, 67 S. W. (2d) 1030 (1934): fixing of minimum sale
price in decree sanctioned, although no statutory authority.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS. Laws 1933, act 57. Eliminated by requiring mortgagee to bid at least amount
of the debt (or fair value if greater). Adams v. Spillyards, x87 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933):
unconstitutional as impairment of contract; construed not to apply to future debts.
CALIFORNIA. MORATORIUM. Laws 1933, cc. 30, 263, 1057. Foreclosure sales of single dwellings under
powers for default in principal postponed for brief periods. Laws 1933, c. 642. Notice of default required
to be recorded 3 months before exercise of power of sale, during which time default may be cured. Laws
1934, Extr. Sess., c. I.* Sales under power or decree for default in principal postponed up to Feb. 1, 1935.
Laws 1935, C.7. Thirty-day period for debtor to apply for stay for "just and equitable period" up to
Sept. 1, 1935, provision to be made for compensation. Laws 1935, c. 348; Laws 1937, cc. 5, 167. Expires
July 1, 1939. Applies to mortgages made before Feb. 1, 1935.* Within go days of recording notice of
default, mortgagor may apply for postponement of sale under power or decree, relief to be granted where
equitable, mortgagor to pay reasonable part of income or rental value, provision for upkeep, taxes, and
insurance being required. Order terminable upon violation. Bennett v. California Trust Co., 6 Cal. (2d)
371, 57 P. (2d) 914 (1936): burden of showing right to relief on petitioner.
REODE2PTioN. Laws 1935, cc. 7, 348; Laws 1937, cc. 5, 167. Expires July 1, 1939. Applies to mortgages made before Feb. 1, 1935.* Period to be extended on petition on same ground and conditions as
provided for postponement of foreclosure sales under these acts.
DEFIcIENcY JUDGMENTS. Laws 1933, c. 642; Laws T935, c. 669. Not to be rendered before Sept. I,
1937 if recording of notice of default has not preceded sale under power at least one year. Brown v.
Ferdon, 5 Cal. (ad) 226, 54 P. (ad) 712 (1936): unconstitutional impairment of contract when applied
retroactively. Laws 1933, c. 790. Action must be brought within 3 months after sale under power.
Christina v. McLoughlin, x8 Cal. App. (ad) 410, 63 P. (2d) 1174 (1937); limitation constitutional.
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Laws 1933, cC. 642, 793; Laws 1937, C. 353. In action for deficiency or on note secured by mortgage,
amount recoverable is difference between debt and "fair value" of property. Rosenberg v. Jansten, it
Cal. App. (ad) 15, 52 P. (2d) 952 (1935): unconstitutional when applied retroactively. Laws 1933, C.
642; Laws 1935, c. 68o. Not to be entered in cases of land purchase contracts or purchase money mortgages. Hales v.Snowden, i9 Cal. App. (ad) 397, 65 P. (2d) 847 (1937): unconstitutional whcn applied
retroactively.
DELAWARE. Laws 1933, 2d Sp. Sess., c. 39. Expired March x, 1935. Execution process nmay be
stayed for 6 months if mortgagor has applied to HOLC and latter has declared willingness to refinance.
GEORGIA.

DEFiCtENC'

JUDGMENTS.

Laws 1935, p. 381.

In foreclosures

under power of sale no

deficiency judgment unless sale reported to court for confirmation within 3o days. Confirmation only if
property brought true market value at sale. No sale under power of sale except by sheriff after advertisement. Atlantic Loan Co. v.Peterson, i8t Ga. 266, 18a S. E. 15 (1935): act unconstitutional as impairment of contract.
IDAHO. MoRAToRIUaM. Laws z933. c. 124. Governor authorized to declare legal holidays limited to certain business and activities. Alliance Trust Co. V.Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285 (D. Idaho, 1933): holiday declared
on foreclosure proceedings, July 18-Sept. 14, 1934, unconstitutional impairment of contract.
RrDENPTION. Laws 1935, c. 36. Expired March s, 1937. Applied to mortgages made before Feb. 20,
1935.* Court to grant such extension of period as it deemed just and equitable but not beyond March
1, 1937, fixing reasonable rental value of property and payments to be made by mortgagor. Alliance Trust
Co. v.Hall, it F. Supp. 668 (D. Idaho, 1935): act constitutional. Laws 1937, c. 64. Redemption period
fixed at one year from sale. Interest payable reduced from so to 6% and attorneys' fees limited to those
actually paid by creditor or evidenced by his written obligation made within 6 months of sale.
DEFiciENCy JuDGMENTs. Laws 1933, c. 15o. Limited to difference between debt plus costs and
"reasonable value" of the property. Laws 1937, c. 31. Entry forbidden in foreclosure cases.
ILLINOIS. MORAToRIum.

Laws 1933, H. B. 507, p. 649. Expired June 30. 1935. Applied to mortgages

orifarms or homesteads held by insurance companies. Authorized Governor or Superintendent of Insurance with approval of former to stay foreclosures or estend time of repayment. Levy P. Broadway-Carnen
Bldg. Corp., 366 I1. 279, 8 N. E. (2d) 671 (937): Court may reject bid at foreclosure sale if grossly
inadequate, fix up-set price and order resale.
IOWA. MORATORIu . Laws 1933, c. 18z; Laws 1933-34, Extr. Sess., c. 137; Laws 1935, cc. i1S,I6;
Laws 1937, c. 8o. Expires March 1, 1939. Applies to mortgages made before Jan. 1, 1936. Foreclosure may
be stayed until March i, 1939, upon application in good -faith, orders being made concerning possession,

and fair rental terms, income to be applied on taxes, insurance, upkeep, etc. Present insolvency or present
inadequacy of security not alone sufficient cause for refusing stay. (See comment, suPrap. 524). Craig a.
Waggoner, 218 Iowa 876, 256 N. W. 285 (1934): moratorium constitutional.
REDE.MpTON. Laws 1933, c. 179; Laws 1933-1934, Extr. Sess., c. 137; Laws 1935, cc,sro, xI; Laws
1937, CC.78, 79. Expires March 1, 1939. Period may be extended until March 1, 1939, in all foreclosure

actions on mortgages made before Jan. 1, 1936. Present insolvency or inadequacy of security not alone
sufficient cause for refusing extension. Des Moines It.Stock Land Bk. v.Nord/zolm, 217 Iowa 1319, 253
N. W. 701 (1934): act constitutional.

Laws 1933-1934, Extr. Sess.,
c. 135. Real property redeemed by

debtor execution proof against foreclosure judgment.
LirnTATroN oN JusxsmENrs. Laws 1935, C. xo8. Judgments obtained without foreclosure on debts
secured by mortgage not subject to renewal by action, and, after 2 years, valid only as set-off or counterclaim. Applicable to future judgments and pending proceedings for, or based on, such judgments.
KANSAS. REsALE. Laws' 1933, C. 218. Court may decline to confirm sale where bid is "substantially
inadequate," or fix upset price, or confirm sale only if fair value be credited on judgment,
REDEMNipTImo.
Laws 1933, c. 232; Laws 1934, Sp. Sess., c. 3; Laws 1935, cc. 225, 226. Expiration
date, Jan. 15, 1937. Applicable to mortgages made before March 2, 1934, if owner acquired title before
March 4, 1933, and has paid r/3 or more of purchase price. Period to be extended as "court may deem

just and equitable." Court to determine income or rental value and direct payment to clerk of amounts
payable in monthly instalments. Order terminable upon 30-day default. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v.
Anthony, 142 Kan. 670, 52 P. (2d) 12o8 (1935): extensions of redemption period previously fixed by
unappealed judgment unconstitutional (see comment, supra p. 528).
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS. Laws 1934, Sp. Sess., c. 3; Laws r935, CC.225, 226. Not to be enforced
until extended period of redemption has expired.

LOUISIANA: MoRArosuM. Laws 1934, no. 559. Expired 2nd Monday in May, 1936. Applies to all
mortgages made before July r3, 1934.* Temporary suspension of foreclosure proceedings but not beyond
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2nd Monday, May, 1936. Metropolitan Life v.Morris, 181 La. 277, 159 So. 388 (1935): moratorium
constitutional, court refusing to consider constitutionality of section abolishing deficiency judgments.
GENERAL DEBT MORATORIUM. Laws 1934, ad Extr. Sess., no. 2; Laws 1935, 4th Extr. Sess.. no. 13;
Laws 1936, no. a; Laws 1938, no. xa6. Expires noth day after adjournment of regular I-gislative session
of ig4o. Applies to all debts made before July 1, 1936, not renewed or extended to expiration date of
act.*
After hearing before Debt Moratorium Commissioner (State Bank Commissioner) debtor may
obtain temporary suspension of laws for enforccment- of debts, judgments, liens or mortgages, on such
conditions as to payments in instalments of otherwise as to the Debt Commissioner "may seem just, reasonable, fit and proper in each particular case involsed." (See comment, supra pp. 524, 525.)
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTs. Laws 1934, no. 159. During time act in effect (till and Monday in May,
1936) no deficiency judgments permitted. Saint Tammany Homestead Ass'n v.Bowers, 183 La. 987, 165
So. 176 (1935): held that Laws 1934, 2d Extr. Sess., no. 2 supersedes this act. Laws 1934, no. 28.
Applies only to mortgages executed after effective date of act. If mortgagee takes advantage of waiver of
appraisal provision in mortgage and proceeds of sale insufficient, debt is discharged nevertheless. Home
Finance Service v.Walmslcy, 176 So. 415 (Ct. Apps. 1937): sale by mortgagee without appraisal forfeits
right to deficiency.
MARYLAND. Laws 1933, Extr. Sess., cc. 56, 57; Laws 1935, c. 527. SALES UNDER PowEs. Not to be
exercised before June 5, 1937, unless consent of 25% of record holders of mortgage consent. U. S. Mtge.
Co. v.Matthews, 293 U. S.232 (1934), rev'g 167 Md. 383, 173 Att. 903 (1934): held constitutional since
pre-existing law governing contracts had made provision for such amendments.
MICHIGAN. Acts 1933, nos. 98, 122; Acts 1934, Extr. Sess., no. 20; Acts 1935, nos. 3, 4, 152, 158; Acts
1937, nos. i, 2. Excepts mortgages after Feb. 14, 1933. Expires Nov. z, I938. MORATORIUM. Pending
foreclosure actions postponed not beyond Nov. s, 1938, on application unless good cause shown to contrary. Foreclosure proceedings and sales by advertisement transferable to courts, and, if already confirmed,
may be set aside where redemption period has not expired. Owners to remain in possession, provision
being made for payment of fair rentals, taxes and insurance. Order terminable upon "substantial violation." Russell v.Battle Creek Lumber Co., 265 Mich. 649, 252 N. W. 561 ( 934): held constitutional on
authority of Blaisdell case. Union Guardian Trust Co. v.Harry & Max Dunitz, Inc., 273 Mich. 607, 263
iN. W. 751 (1935): relief denied applicant who purchased during foreclosure. Equitable Trust Co. v.
Solovich, 28o N. W. 1i4 (1938): relief denied where no possibility of refinancing apparent. Virginian It.
Stock Land Bk. V.Hudson, 266 Mich. 644, 254 N. W. 234 (1934): burden of proof is on applicant and
is not sustained where he was not diligent in meeting obligations or in seeking relief.
REOrMPTION. Court may extend period (but not beyond Nov. 1, 1938) subject to same terms as provided for stay of foreclosure. Wade v.Farrell, 270 Mich. 562, 259 N. W. 326 ( 935): relief denied
where no application therefor made when foreclosure was instituted. Detroit Trust Co. v.Slack, 273
Mich. 461, 263 N. W. 429 (1935): relief denied second mortgagee where possibility of redemption remote.
UPSET PRIcE. Acts 1933, no. 229. May be fixed by court in any foreclosure by action. Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v.Wetsman, 277 Mich. 322, 269 N. W. 189 '(1936): -trial courts refusal to fix upset price
not error in absence of clear and convincing testimony.
DE.viciENCY JuDcME.Ts. Not to be entered where foreclosure is by advertisement. If by action and
if judgment is entered after Jan. 1, 1933, not to be enforced before March x, 1937. Acts 1937, no. 143.
Applies to foreclosures by advertisement after Feb. 1I,1933. Defendant may show amount bid less than
"true value" of property and difference between "true value" and bid shall be defense pro tanto. Issue
to be determined by court without jury.
MINNESOTA. Laws 1933, cc. 44, go; Laws 1935, c. 47; Laws 1937, C. 21. Expires March s, 1939.
Applies to mortgages made before April 18, 1933.* MORATORIUM. Mortgagor may obtain postponement
of sale by advertisement and order that foreclosure proceed by action.
RESALE. To be ordered in foreclosures by action where sale price is unreasonably and unfairly inadequate in view of evidence relating to value of property and general economic conditions.
REDEMPTION. Court may extend period, but not beyond March 1, 1939, by order, which must provide for payment of income of property toward taxes, interest, insurance, or principal of debt. Period
terminable upon violation of order. Blaisdell v.Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 1:89
Minn. 422, 249 N. W.
334 (1933), afl'd, 290 U. S.398 (1934):'act held constitutional. Nat. Bank of Aitkin v.Showell, 195
Minn. 273, 262 N. W. 689 (935): emergency held to exist in 1935.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTs. None obtainable before March s, 1939.
MISSISSIPPI. Laws 1934, c. 247*; Laws 1936, c. 287; Laws 1938, H. B. No. x52. Expires May 1,1940.
Applies to mortgages and judgments existing before March 4, 1933. MORATORIUM. Foreclosure under
powers and execution sales may be enjoined if petitioner shows inability to refinance through United
States agency. In foreclosure in chancery, sale may be postponed two years, court to determine income or
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rental value of property and order payment of all or part thereof toward taxes, insurance, interest, and
upkeep. Order terminable on default for 3o days unless longer default caused 'by "good reason wholly
beyond the control of the defaulter." Wilson Banking Co. Liquidating Corp. v. Colvard, 172 Miss. 804,
s6s So. 123 (935): act constitutional under Blaisdell case. Hooks V. Gann, 173 Miss. 23, 16l So. 7o2
(1935): relief available to junior mortgagee. Atlantic Life Ins. Co. I. Klotz, 181 So. 519 (1938): continuation of emergency questioned (see comment, supra p. 522).
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS.

No action to be maintained until extension expires.

MONTANA. MORA'roRIUm. Laws 1933, c. 116. Expired March s, 1935. Stay of foreclosure actions till
March 1, 1935, in discretion of court, order to make provision for such payments of interest, rents,

profits, etc., as court deemed necessary.
REDEmPTON,. Laws 1933, c. 150. Purchaser
during redemption period. Laws 1935, C. 122;
mortgages made before March 13, 1935.* Period
1939, mortgagor to pay all or reasonable part of

at sale not entitled to possession of home of mortgagor
Laws 1937, c. 73. Expires March 1, 1939. Applies to

to be extended "just and equitable time" up to March I,
income or rental value for taxes, insurance, interest, etc.

Order terminable on 30 days default.
DEFICIENCY JUDoMENrs. Laws 1935, C. 2. Applies to mortgages made after Feb. 5, 1935. Not to be
granted on purchase money mortgages. Laws 1935, C. 122; Laws 1937, C. 73. Expires March I, 1939.

Applies to mortgages made before March 13, 1935.
expiration of redemption period.

Deficiency judgments not to be entered before

NEBRASKA. MORATORIuM. Laws 1933, c. 65; Laws 1935, c. 41; Laws 1937, C. 42. Expires March I,
1939. Applies to mortgages and sales made before March I, x934. Foreclosures may be stayed until

March 1, 1939, orders being made concerning possession and fair rental terms, the income to be paid
toward taxes, interest, insurance and upkeep. Actions on notes secured by mortgage may be stayed 9
months after judgment, further stays being obtainable on conditions prescribed for staying foreclosures.
First Trust Co. v. Smith, 277 N. W. 762 (1938): act unconstitutional as of Feb., 1937, under state constitution, emergency having expired (see comment, supra p. 522).
DEFClaEscY JUDGMENTs. Laws 1933, c. 41. Courts denied power to enter deficiency judgments.
NEW HAMPSHIRE. Laws 1933, C. x61; Laws 1935, C. 3. Expired June 15, 1937. Applied to mortgages
made before June 15, 1933. MORATORIUM. Foreclosure stayed on showing of "unjust hardship" caused by

abnormal economic conditions. Application must list mortgagor's liabilities and assets and state his past
record in meeting obligations.
REDEMPTON. Might be extended for such period as would not work unjust hardship on parties.
NEW JERSEY. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTs. Laws 1933, C. 82; Laws 1935, c. 88. Expiration date, July I,
1938. Actions must be brought within 3 months after confirmation of sale, amount recoverable being
difference between debt and "fair market value" as determined by court or 3 appraisers chosen by parties.
Debtor not applying for this determination may redeem within 6 months from date of judgment. Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., xsI N. J. L. 596, 169 At. 177 (1933): 1933 act unconstitutional as impairment
of contract. Alert Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bechtold, 199 At. 734 (1938): though preamble declaring
emergency was added and expiration date fixed, 1935 act also unconstitutional.

NEW MEXICO. Laws 1934, Sp. Sess., C. 26. In foreclosures on property whereon there is a growing crop,
instituted after March 15, of any year, mortgagor (erroneously "mortgagee" in act) may not be dispossessed until crop harvested, and may retain crop. Instrument may provide otherwise.
MORATOIuaIm. Laws 1933, c. 793; Laws 1934, cC.278, 357, 890; Laws 1935, Cc. I, 17, 318,
703; Laws 1937, c. 82, 713, 714; Laws 1938, C. 500. Expires Jan. I,
763; Laws 1936, cc. 86, 286, 6,
1940. Applies to mortgages made before July 1, 1932, except building and loan mortgages payable in

NEW YORK.

instalments over so or more years. New and pending foreclosures and actions on obligations secured by
mortgage suspended during continuance of emergency where default is solely in payment of principal or
instalment thereof. Mortgagee may apply to have any surplus earnings over fixed charges applied toward
principal. Interest rate not to be increased upon maturity of obligation during emergency. Waivcr of
provisions declared against public policy. Loporto v. The Druiss Co., Inc., 268 N. Y. 699, 198 N. E. 565
(1935); id., 269 N. Y. 677, 200 N. E. 54 (1936) 299 U. S. 617: act constitutional.
DEFICIENCY JUDOIENTs. Laws 1933, C. 794; Laws 1934, CC.277, 562, 564; Laws 1935, CC.2, 268;
Laws 1936, c. 87; Laws 1937, cc. 83, 705; Laws z9 8, c. 5or. Expires July 1, 1939. Applies to mortgages
made after July s, 1932. Where foreclosure action is begun or property sold during emergency no
deficiency judgment unless plaintiff move for determination by court of the "fair and reasonable market
value" of the property, the amount recoverable to be difference between judgment debt and such value
of property, less prior liens. In actions on obligations secured by mortgage value of property may be set
off against debt. Klinke v. Samnuels, 264 N. Y. 144, I9o N. E. 324 (934): act constitutional.

STATE LEGISLATIVE RELIEF FOR THE MORTGAGE DEBTOR
NORTH CAROLINA. MORATOiUm. Public-Local Laws 1933, cc. 74, 380, 525, 547. For two years foreclosures under powers or by action may be continued for one year from date of report or action. (Applicable to ccrtain counties only.) Laws 1933, C. 275. Foreclosure sales or confirmations may be enjoined to
avoid irreparable damage, plaintiff to give bond against losses resulting therefrom. Woltz v. Asheville Safe
Deposit Co., 2o6 N. C. 239; 173 S. E. 587 (1934): act constitutional. Whitaker v. Chase, 206 N. C. 335,
174 S. E. 225 (1934): injunction available to junior mortgagee.
REsALE. Laws 1933, C. 275. Court having enjoined confirmation may order resale, provided bond is
given, or receiver appointed, and prior liens paid where necessary.
DEFIcIENeY JUDGMENTs. Laws 1933, c. 36. Not to be granted on purchase money mortgages showing
their purpose on their face. Notes prepared by sellers for this purpose must contain identifying provision.
Public-Local Laws 1933, cc. 350, 425. Time to file answer extended two years. (Applicable to certain
counties only.) Laws 1933, C. 275. Defendant may show as defense and set-off that property sold was
"fairly worth" the debt secured or that "amount bid was substantially less than its true value." Applicable
only to sales under powers not previously confirmed. Richmond Mtge. & Loan Corp. P. Wachovia Bk. &
Trust Co., 300 U. S. 124 (937) aff'g 21o N. C. 29, 185 S. E. 482 (1936): act constitutional. Laws 1933,
C. 529. Actions for deficiency must be brought within one year of date of sale.
NORTH DAKOTA. MoaRAToRium. Laws 1933, CC.155, 156, 158; Laws 1935, C. 242; Laws 1937, C. 16r.
Expires July 1, 1939. Applies to mortgages made before Feb. 15, 5937.* Foreclosures may be stayed but
not beyond July 1, 1939, nor without requirement that reasonable payments on taxes, interest, etc., be
made by mortgagor. Foreclosures under power of sale may be transferred, on petition, to courts. Resale
may be ordered if court finds that bid price "unfairly inadequate." No deficiency judgments may be
obtained during period of acts.
REDEMPTION. Laws 1933, C. 357; Laws 1935, C. 242; Laws 1937, c. 161. Expires July 1, 1939. Extends redemption periods but not beyond July 1, 1939, and on condition that during extended period mortgagor pay reasonable amount on taxes, etc.
"The court shall have no power to
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS. Laws 1933, c. 155; Laws 1937, c. 159.
render a deficiency judgment" Purchaser at sale not entitled to possession of property or income therefrom until expiration of.a year following sale. Though expressly not repealing the above acts, Laws 1935,
C. 242; Laws 1937, c. 16x, provide that no deficiency judgments obtainable until July I, 1939.
OHIO. MoRATOItoum. Laws 1933, p. 227; Laws 1934, p. 327; Laws 1935, p. io; Laws X937, S. B. 16.

Expires April 1, 1939. Applies to mortgages and other specific liens made before May 18, 1933. Court
may order postponement of sale and enforcement of debt until such time (but not later than April I,
1939) as it may believe just and equitable in light of interests of the affected parties and of existing
economic conditions. Current taxes, insurance and interest due after postponement must be paid, order
being terminable upon default. Virginia It. Stock Land Bk. v. ShafFer, 7 Ohio Op. 186 (Ct. App., 1936):
act constitutional but affords no relief after sale.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTs. Laws 1937, S. B. 27. Judgments on debts secured by mortgages on dwellings
for not more than two families to become null and void two years from date of act or judgment, whichever
is later. Executions issued within such period not to be affected. Creditor's bill may be brought within
four years.
OKLAHOMA. MowAToiuuat. Laws 1933, C. z6. Expired March 7, 1935. Time to answer foreclosure
action extended 9 months; where answers were already filed, trials postponed 9 months. Continuances
may be granted in discretion of court for not more than life of act (z years) if mortgagor pays accruing
interest or reasonable rental of property adequately secures debt. Roth v. Waterfield, 167 Okla. 209, 29
P. (ad) 24 (1933): arbitrary extension of time for answer unconstitutional as violation of due process and
of state constitutional requirement that courts to be open at all times; discretionary continuances valid.
PENNSYLVANIA. MoRAToRium. Laws 1933, no. 137; Laws 1935,* no. 5; Laws 1937, nos. 225,* 297.*
Expires March 31, 1939. All writs of execution may be stayed in discretion of court to avoid "serious
inequity," subject to provision for payment of costs, taxes, interest, insurance, repairs, etc.
DEFICIENCY JUDG ENTS. Laws 1933, Extr. Sess., no. 59; Laws 1935, c. 197. If mortgagee applies
within 6 months, fair value of property to be credited on judgment; otherwise mortgagor may apply for
entry of satisfaction. Beaver Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winovich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 Atl. 481 (1936);
Shallcross'v. North Branch-Sedgwick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 123 Pa. Super. 593, 187 Ad. 819 (1936): acts
unconstitutional impairments. Laws 1937, c. 37. Proceedings to reopen judgments satisfied under
previous laws to be begun within 3 months after March 24, 1937. Laws 1937, c. 56.* Before issuance of
execution on foreclosure, mortgagee must either release debtor from personal liability or apply for
fixation of fair market value. If this amount is not bid at sale, court is to order successive postponements
of sale, not to exceed 2 years. Pennsylvania Co. v. Scott, 198 Ad. 115 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1938): unconstitutional as violating state constitution prohibiting local or special laws (see comment, supra pp. 533, 534).
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REDEMPIoN. Laws 1932, no. 877; Laws 1933, no. 366. Bids remain open for
3o days following foreclosure sale, during which anyone except mortgagee may raise bid. Not applicable
unless deficiency judgment asked.
MORATORIum. Laws 1934, no. 1214; Laws 1936, no. 1356. Expired Oct. 10, 1937. Allplicd to
settlemortgages made before March 2, 1934. Provides for appointment of conciliation boards to effect
ments between mortgagors and mortgagees. Foreclosures may be stayed, reasonable rental fixed and
orders of sale conditioned or waiver of deficiency judgment.
SOUTH CAROLINA.

DrFICIENCY JUDOMIENTS.

Laws 1933, no. 264.

Within 90 days after advertisement mortgagor may

have appointment of appraisers who shall report "true value" of property which is credited on the
mortgagee's judgment. Applies to all mortgages present and future. Federal Land Bank v.Garrison, 185
S. C. 255, 193 S. E. 308 (1938): act unconstitutional as impairment of contract.
SOUTH DAKOTA.

ay AnvFRTISEMNT.

FORECLOSURE

Laws 1933, C. 135.

Transferred

to court on

application of mortgagor. State ex rel. Northwestern Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Circuit Cf., 61 S. D. 356, 249
N. W. 631 (1933): held constitutional as affecting remedy only.
REDEMPTION. Laws 1933, c. 137; Laws 1935, c. 178; Laws 1937, cc. 163, 207. Applies to mortgages
made before Feb. 18, 1937. Period may be extended beyond one year (but not beyond March i, 1937)
upon order requiring petitioner to pay all or reasonable part of income or rental value towards insurance,
taxes, and interest and principal of debt and safeguarding against waste. Order terminable upon violation.
Lund v.Eggleston, 279 N. W. 546 (1938): order allowing mortgagor to live rent free in apartment house
otherwise rented reversed. (See comment, supra p. 527.)
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTs.

Laws 1933, c. 138; Laws 1935, c. 150. Applies to mortgages made after

Feb. 2, 1933.* Not to be granted in cases of purchase money mortgages or mortgages foreclosed by advertisement. Laws 1937, C.2o8. 'True market value" to be credited on judgment if obtained by mortgagee
and if properly sold by advertisement. 0935 act not repealed).
TEXAS. Mozt.-osum. Laws 1933, cc. 17, 59, 1o2, io5 . Brief postponements of foreclosure sales. Laws
1934, 2nd Called Sess., C.2. Brief postponement of foreclosure sales. Laws 1934, 2nd Called Sess., c. 16.
Expiration date, Feb. 1, 1935. Stays in foreclosure suits and injunctions against sales under powers authorized on motion that sale would be "unfair and result in a loss," that property value substantially exceeds
debt, and that reasonable income or rental value will be paid by mortgagor. Travellers Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S. W. (2d) 1007 (1934): unconstitutional as impairment of contract. (See comment, supra p. 521.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTs.

Laws 1933, c. 92.

"Actual value" of property to be credited.

Six months

limitation on actions and on issuance of execution. Langever v.Miller, 124 Tex. 8o, 76 S.W. (ad) 1025
(1934): unconstitutional as impairment of contract and invasion of judicial power. Texas Nat. Securies
Co. v.Oldham, 88 S.W. (2d) 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935): period of limitation invalidated as inseparable
from rest of act.
VERMONT. Laws 1933, no. 30; Laws 1935, no. 49. MORATORJUm. Expired March i, 1937. Stay of
execution sales may be ordered by chancellor for not more than 3 months. On petition showing debtor's
"past business record," that he is solvent, etc., period may be extended an additional 6o days.
REDampraioO. At time of foreclosure decree chancellor may extend redemption period "as may appear
to him to be for the benefit of all parties interested."
WASHINGTON. DEFICIENCY JuDGMENTs. Laws 1935, C. 525.* Court may in its discretion fix upset
price. Confirmation only if upset price or fair value of property is credited on foreclosure judgment, Only
for excess of debt over upset price or fair value of property.
WEST VIRGINIA.

Laws 1933,

C. 34.

SALES UNDER TRUST DEEns.

Confirmation only if sale price

reasonably adequate; otherwise resale may be repeatedly ordered. Conveyances by trustees without leave
of court forbidden. Staud v.Sill, 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (5933): act unconstitutional as attempt
to confer non-judicial powers on court.
WISCONSIN. REDEMPTION. Laws 1931, Sp. Sess., cc. 24, 29; Laws 1933, cc. I1, i5, 125, 240, 46,474,
494; Laws 1935, cc. 319, 482, 5o6'; Laws 1937, c. 15; Laws X937, Sp. Sess., c. 5. Expires April 1, 1939.
Applies to mortgages on homes given before July I, 1939. Period of redemption may be extended to
April x, 1940, upon orders for reasonable payments on taxes, etc. (A mediation board was quasi-judicial,
advisory functions discontinued in 1937.) Mutual Bldg. & Sav. Ass'n v. Willing, 221 Wis. 563, 267
N. W. 297 0936): 1935 moratorium constitutional.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS. Laws 1933, C. 13; Laws 1935, C. 449. Upset price may be fixed. No confirmation of sale or deficiency judgment unless fair value of property credited on debt. Laws 1933, c. 125.

Prohibits actions at law until after foreclosure. Hananer v.Republic Bldg. Co. 2x6 Wis. 49, 255 N. W.
136 (1934): unconstitutional as impairment of contracts. Laws 5935, c. 5o6; Laws 1937, Sp. Sess., C.5.
Entry of judgments without foreclosure on debts made before Jan. x, 1935, may be postponed for one

year but not beyond March 1, 1939.

